A Fiery Peace in a Cold War presents itself as an epic story of the genesis of America's nuclear missile program, centering around one man whom, Sheehan tells us, was perhaps the single most influential actor in this saga. It is indeed an epic tale, and it it masterfully told. But it is good history?

The book begins with the story of how the Schreibers arrived in America from German- interesting reading, if not terribly germane to the history of America's missile program. The rest of the first 50 pages are devoted to following Schreiber's career, up through the end of WWII. The narrative then switches over to a discussion of the Manhattan Project, the use of the atomic bomb, and post-war developments in Europe- especially those involving Stalin's Soviet Union. Sheehan's discussion of Soviet atomic espionage is pretty good (although there are no particular revelation here) but his interpretations of Stalins intentions in the post-war period are a bit confused. He states that Stalin had no expansionist intentions- beyond holding on to large parts of Eastern Europe, which certainly strikes me as expansionist. Sheehan also states that Stalin opposed North Korea's actions against the South- yet Stalin also supplied heavy weapons and aircraft to North Korea, and supplied pilots to fly these aircraft for the North Koreans.

Schreiber re-enters the narrative in 1950, with his assignment to an advanced planning group at the Pentagon, reporting to the Air Force's new chief, General Curtis LeMay. Sheehan's description of LeMay vacillates between portraying him as an egotistical buffoon and a skilled leader. Whenever Schreiver goes up against LeMay, LeMay is a cigar-chomping buffoon. When he supports Schreiber, suddenly he's a man of great judgment and honesty. And that brings up a major flaw of this book: Recounting history via the life of one individual is a good technique for building an interesting and personal narrative, but it invites the error of assigning too much importance to a single individual, and in the hands of many amateur historians, blinding the author to the faults of his hero, and the accomplishments of others. Sheehan does occasionally fall into this trap. In the nearly 500 pages that comprise this volume, I don't think there's a single sentence that describes a fault in Schreiber's character, or a poor decision he made- although much is made of the flaws in the character and decisions of others.

Sheehan's story is also troubled by a large number of technical errors that suggest Sheehan didn't really understand the the things he was writing about enough to question them. He states that the manned space program capsules were modified versions of the reentry vehicles designed for nuclear warheads, which is absolute nonsense.The two may look alike, but function in completely different ways. He repeats the error of ascribing the design of the IAS computer to John von Neumann, who wrote the official government report on the machine, when it was in fact designed by Mauchly and Eckhart. In his discussion of the resolution of the first spy satellites, he confuses the resolution of the optical system- 50 lines/mm- with its resolution of targets on the ground. He refers to a radar PPI display as an "oscilloscope", which it may have resembled, but was a very different device. Many of his his attempts to explain technical matters are just plain confusing, like his explanation of inertial guidance.

The bulk of the book is taken up with the decisions that led to America's first ICBMs and IRBMs, the struggles between the USAF and NASA, political infighting, and how this all played out on the world stage. There's a good historical discussion of the Cuban Missile Crisis, although unlike many historians, Sheehan portrays Kennedy as the unquestioning hero, contrasting his careful, decisive confrontation with Khrushchev against those hotheads who argued for a preemptive military strike.Lost in this discussion are those who argued for a third course that would probably have accomplished the same ends diplomatically, by trading the US missile bases in Turkey (which were what triggered Khrushchev's decision to place missiles in Cuba) for the Cuban missiles without bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war. Sheehan also notes how the increased threat and cost of a superior US nuclear arsenal helped to bring about the collapse of the USSR- although oddly missing is any discussion of the MX system that began under Carter, the IRBMs placed in Great Britain and Europe in the 1980s, or any mention of Reagan and Thatcher, two rather important persons behind those decisions.

And yet, for all these faults, this is still an worthwhile book that presents, in a clear narrative, a fairly good overall picture of the genesis and the history of the US missile program in a way that makes clear how and why many critical decisions were made. Readers interested in the history of the 20th Century, and America's rise as the dominant world power will still find much in it that's both enlightening and interesting. But it should be read with a critical eye.

Pulitzer Prize winner Neil Sheehan's "A Fiery Peace in a Cold War" is a REALLY good book. Not everyone will agree with that assessment, of course. Some will complain that Mr. Sheehan oversimplifies the complex post-World-War-II international interactions that defined ideological battlegrounds for the next 50 years---but whole books could be written on just that subject. Some will quibble with the motives he attributes to American and Soviet leaders as the two nations squared off for what was perceived as a global battle for the "hearts and minds" of the world's nonaligned peoples---but his analyses are as good as any, and better than most. Others will insist that this is "revisionist history," as new information (the Venona transcripts, for example) shows us that past events may not have been exactly as they seemed at the time---but such information is of great value because it forces us to re-think what we thought we knew. Some will even say, "Where is Bennie Schriever? I thought this book was supposed to be about him?"

It's true there are long stretches of "A Fiery Peace in a Cold War" in which Bernard Schriever does not appear. This simply proves that this work is very much more than a biography of the U.S. Air Force officer who was largely responsible for the development of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). It is actually a highly readable condensed history of the Cold War and of the "ultimate weapon," the nuclear-tipped ICBM, with which the U.S. and the Soviet Union threatened each other for almost 50 frightening years. Schriever played a major role in this story, of course, but there is much more to the book than that. Other players in the tale, such as, for example, Curtiss LeMay, John von Neumann, Trevor Gardner and Edward Hall, made vital contributions in forging that weapon. Mr. Sheehan often lets Schriever fade into the background in favor of covering the lives and work of these other key men. His account is very well-rounded, with just the right combination of straightforward narrative and fascinating anecdotes. It comes as close as any other book to correctly describing how a complex process like engineering an ICBM really works.

Mr. Sheehan writes exceptionally well, with an effortless style (really the result of much hard work) that makes the pages fly by. He seems equally at ease discussing political and technical subjects, and he conveys superbly the meaning and context of the advances in rocket technology that Schriever supervised. Few other authors that I've read match his ability to integrate human, political, technical and historical subjects into such a compelling narrative.

There are several other histories of the Cold War and ICBM development available, of course. But "A Fiery Peace in a Cold War" is the best and most accessible that I've read in many years. Comprehensive, highly readable, technically correct (mostly--there are a few minor errors) and historically accurate, it is sure to be a very satisfying read for students of modern history, military "buffs" and technology "geeks" of any ilk. It earns my highest possible recommendation. Perhaps another Pulitzer for Mr. Sheehan is not out of the question...

Although many may rate this book highly, please allow me to dissent. The story that should be and is told is that of Bernard Schriever and his work. He was arguably the Air Force father of intercontinental ballistic missiles and the man that gave the U.S. an edge in the Cold War that kept World War III from happening until the Soviet Union collapsed. That is a stupendous story and one little known in the US where schoolchildren and college students are not taught history. If this work had been scholarly and concentrated on that important story, no doubt I would have given it a rating of 5.

Unfortunately, this is not a scholarly work, but a journalistic report in which the author describes all the important characters with a mind-numbing array of adjectives, portraying each as evil, heroic, conflicted, inept, limited, etc., etc., according to the author's personal opinion. As a journalist, the author has put "an edge" on all his characters, instead of presenting a scholarly examination and allowing the reader to form his own opinions. But, alas, that is what American journalism has fallen to, only now the author has applied these techniques to historical works.

With the introduction of each player in the missile drama, the author presents a biography taking multiple pages, almost as if he is intent on doing Ernie Pyle one better. As soon as the reader see one of these digressions, he should skip the next few pages to get on with the story without losing focus. It is amazing to me that the editors at Random House did not cut out all this material as being mostly irrelevant. That will shorten the book by probably a hundred pages.

In addition, the author interjects his opinion on a wide range of history, some of which is irrelevant to the story, such as that Hitler shot himself by putting his gun into his mouth. Unfortunately, most sources, including the Soviets, state that Hitler shot himself in his right temple. This point is totally superfluous, except to demonstrate the journalist's insatiable need to show his command of all the facts, even if those facts are wrong. The book is shot through and through with irrelevant digressions, such as that the U.S. population does not comprehend the Soviet Union's tremendous losses in World War II, even in part blaming this on the "self-serving" memoirs of German Generals such as Guderian and Manstein. The author should read "Crusade in Europe" or "Calculated Risk" to see self-serving memoirs (by Eisenhower & Mark Clark.) So why the snarky comment about the self-serving memoirs? More to the point, why all the snarky comments throughout the book on people the author evidently doesn't like.

On the other hand, when the author is enamored with an individual like John Kennedy or John von Neumann, he goes into flights of journalistic fancy. Unfortunately, here again, the author has his facts askew. Apparently he depended on Goldstine in giving von Neumann credit for the stored program concept in computers, when actually the great preponderance of the evidence proves that von Neumann was given documents by Mauchly containing his (Mauchly's) idea for using stored programs, and von Neumann rushed that idea into print as his own before Mauchly. (Not nice, Dr. von Neumann.) In many respects, von Neumann's impact on the development of computers was actually negative, mostly due to his dilettantish insertion of himself at the highest government scientific levels due to his reputation in mathematics. He did the same thing in this story, although his involvement did help turn the tide to obtain funding from the Federal Government. But the author waxed poetically over von Neumann to an embarrassing extreme -- without mentioning that von Neumann was an arrested juvenile, much like Mozart, who liked to drop things on the floor alongside pretty women so he could catch a look up their skirts. He was also afraid of dying, and converted to Catholism to protect himself in case the Catholics were right (the author portrays this somewhat differently.)

Another individual who could do no wrong was JFK who, according to the author, saved the world from destruction in the Cuban Missile Crisis. This is total bunkum, as the author conveniently forgets that Kennedy performed poorly at Vienna in his meeting with Khrushchev, enabling Khrushchev to order the building of the Berlin Wall in August, then Kennedy did nothing when the Wall went up, further enabling Khrushchev to push further against what he perceived as a weak President, by moving missiles to Cuba in September. Then the author forgets that Kennedy was only one hour away from ordering military operations to commence against Cuba when Khrushchev managed to reach Kennedy with his "blink." History tells us that Kennedy was willing to blow up the world rather than be outfoxed a third time and suffer what his ego couldn't allow, but the author doesn't.

Other descriptions include Ted Hall, one of the most devastating spies the Soviets ever had in the U.S. as sympathetic, Werner von Braun as "ammoral", and General Maxwell Taylor as needing a boot in the rear to help him make his jump in Normandy (sounds like journalistic gossip to me.) Why he even goes into Hall's treachery is beyond me, particularly since the author is wrong about the Soviets learning about the Venona Project from Philby -- actually they learned about it from one of their spies in the FBI. And on and on. There are so many incorrect statements presented as fact, that the what is probably right must be called into question. The author's condemnation of Kennan's "long telegram" misleading American policy towards the Soviet Union is partially true, but then the author falls into accepting part of Kennan's thesis only a few pages later. Supposedly Stalin was not expansionistic (like Hitler.) Really? Exactly where is the evidence for that? And there is much evidence against it.

On the other hand, the description of what Schriever had to do to get his budget approved was priceless. Unfortunately, matters are worse today, and the bureaucracy has swollen beyong belief. The author also accurately points out the paucity of intelligence on Soviet missile progress (the CIA did not have good agents in place), although it was clear the Soviets were obtaining fairly accurate intelligence on the U.S. It must be remembered that Roosevelt's administration was widely penetrated by Soviet spies as the Venona Project showed in 1995 (& McCarthy was right.)

And last, the author states that no one could have forseen that the Cold War actions were just to gain time until the Soviet Union would collapse from within due to its faulty system. Gee, Roosevelt made exactly that prediction -- that's why he wasn't worried about Soviet power over the long haul. Funny, the author didn't know that, particularly since Roosevelt was another one of his heroes. And if the reader needs any further indication that this is a journalistic piece of work, the author himself says so with his statement that "I do not use footnotes." No kidding, that would cramp his journalistic style and license.

In conclusion, I give this book a 2+ rating. The basic story is definitely worth reading, even amazing and exciting, but unfortunately the author has managed to foul it up beyond belief (FUBB.)